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Abstract 
Posttraumatic stress responses have been linked to a range of social-cognitive and 
sociodemographic factors. Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy suggests that responding to 
a traumatic life event with a set of irrational beliefs should play a crucial role in predicting 
the development of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD: Ellis, 2001). The current study 
assessed the role of trauma-specific irrational beliefs in the prediction of clinically relevant 
posttraumatic stress responses, while controlling for a range of important sociodemographic 
factors. A sample of 313 trauma-exposed military and law enforcement personnel took part in 
the current study and were divided into two groups according to the intensity of reported 
PTSD symptomology. Results of the binary logistic regression indicated that trauma-specific 
Catastrophizing, Low Frustration Tolerance, and Depreciation beliefs, respectively, 
significantly predicted belonging to the group reporting strong symptoms of PTSD compared 
to those reporting mild symptoms of PTSD. These results provide important evidence of the 
role of irrational beliefs in posttraumatic stress responses and highlight the importance of 
considering context-specific variants of each irrational belief process. 
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Introduction 
Large-scale national epidemiological surveys reveal that the anywhere between 60-90% of 
western populations will experience at least one traumatic event in their lifetime (Bresslau et 
al., 1998; Creamer, Burgess, & McFarlane, 2001; Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & 
Nelson, 1995). Exposure to traumatic experiences does not appear to be evenly distributed 
throughout the population. Inner city dwellers seem to experience greater community-related 
violence (Norris & Slone, 2007) while employees in front-line emergency service 
occupations such as military personnel, law enforcement officers, paramedics and fire-
fighters are exposed to traumatic incidents much more commonly (Corneil, Beaton, Murphy, 
Johnson, & Pike, 1999). Comparable rates of trauma exposure have been found in other 
western countries with Creamer et al. (2001) reporting that within a nationally representative 
sample of Australian adults, 50% of females and 65% of males had experienced a minimum 
of one significant trauma during their lifetime. Among nations that experience high levels of 
civil unrest and war, exposures to serious traumatic events are even higher with as many as 
90% of the population found to have been exposed to a serious trauma in their lifetime (de 
Jong et al., 2001). In Algeria, 92% of the population reported experiencing a serious 
traumatic event, and within this population prevalence of posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) was found to be 37.4%. 
 Despite the frequency with which individuals within the population are exposed to 
traumatic life events, relatively few people actually go on to develop clinically significant 
symptoms of PTSD. Successive national comorbidity surveys conducted in the United States 
have suggested prevalence rates of 7.8% (Kessler et al., 1995) and 6.8% (Kessler, Berglund, 
Demler, Jin, Merikangas, & Walters, 2005; Kessler, Chiu, Demler, Merikengas, & Walters, 
2005).  
PTSD Diagnosis 
 PTSD is an anomalous psychiatric condition as it along with its precursor Acute 
Stress Disorder are the only disorders listed within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-5: American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013) that require the 
presence of a specific etiological variable for a diagnosis to be made; namely the direct 
experience of, or being witness to, an extremely stressful event. Despite a great deal of 
empirical literature on the subject, there is much controversy surrounding many of the 
theoretical and clinical features of PTSD (Rosen, Spitzer, & McHugh, 2008). Much of this 
controversy concerns two major issues. Firstly, an enormous body of factor analytic research 
has led to a reconceptualisation of the symptom structure of PTSD in the new addition of the 
DSM so that the official diagnostic classification comes more in-line with the overwhelming 
majority of evidence supporting a four-factor solution (see Yufik & Simms, 2010). Secondly, 
it is apparent that an “extreme stressor” is not necessary for the development of PTSD as 
many individuals can develop clinically relevant symptoms following routine life events such 
as loss of employment, divorce, social upheaval, and bereavement (Rosen & Lilienfeld, 
2008). Furthermore, evidence of a dose-response relationship is inconsistent with findings 
suggesting that increasingly severe traumatic experiences are not always related to more 
intense traumatic reactions (e.g., McNally, 2003; Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2008).  
Social-Cognitive Models of PTSD 
 Social-cognitive models of PTSD generally focus on the effect that experience of a 
traumatic stressful event has on an individual’s existing belief system. Contemporary 
cognitive models are mainly derived from the theoretical perspective of Cognitive Therapy 
(CT). A number of influential cognitive models of PTSD have been developed (e.g. Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000; Resick & Schnicke, 1993). In Ehlers & Clark’s (2000) model of PTSD, two 
cognitive processes are deemed critical in the development and maintenance of the disorder. 
First, there is an overly negative interpretation of the traumatic event and its sequelea, and 
second, there is a poor elaboration of the memory of the traumatic incident and insufficient 
integration of the trauma memory within one’s autobiographical memory. Clark and Beck 
(2010) have presented an updated cognitive model of PTSD in which traumatic experiences 
are hypothesised to interact with pre-existing schematic vulnerability factors. This gives rise 
to a range of maladaptive beliefs about the self, others, the world, the future, and the 
traumatic event itself. The presence of these belief systems has a negative impact on a 
number of cognitive processes leading to faulty trauma memories and attentional cognitive 
biases towards threatening stimuli. This process is hypothesised to produce the characteristic 
intrusive and hyperarousal symptoms which are consequently appraised in a negative manner 
leading to maladaptive behavioural control strategies which involve avoidance and emotion 
control/suppression efforts. A range of psychometrically validated measures of PTSD 
cognitions derived from these theoretical models have been developed (e.g. Foa, Ehlers, 
Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 1999; Najavits, Gotthardt, Weiss, & Epstein, 2004; Vogt, Shipherd, 
& Resick, 2012). One of the most frequently utilized measures of dysfunctional trauma-
cognitions is the Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI: Foa et al., 1999). This scale 
captures three dysfunctional cognitive processes: Negative Cognitions about the Self, 
Negative Cognitions about the World, and Self-Blame beliefs (Daie-Gabai, Aderka, Allon-
Schindel, Foa, & Gilboa-Schechtman, 2011). Various studies utilizing the PTCI have 
indicated that the Negative Cognitions about the Self are most strongly associated with 
symptoms of PTSD, and depression (Daie-Gabai et al., 2011; Foa & Rauch, 2004). Given 
that the PTCI and other existent measures of dysfunctional trauma-related cognitions are 
derived from the theoretical perspective of CT theory these scales focus exclusively on 
capturing representational cognitions rather than the evaluative or appraisal based cognitions 
stressed by REBT theory (see Hyland & Boduszek, 2012 or David & Szentagotai, 2006 for a 
fuller discussion on this distinction). 
 From the perspective of REBT theory therefore these cognitive models and 
psychometric measures are somewhat incomplete. Contemporary REBT theory (David, Lynn, 
& Ellis, 2010; Ellis, 2001; Hyland & Boduszek, 2012) describes four main irrational belief 
processes: (i) Demandingness beliefs which are rigid imperatives for how things “must be”, 
“have to be”, “ought to be”, or “absolutely should be”; (ii) Catastrophizing beliefs which are 
extreme negative evaluations of unpleasant life events; (iii) Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs 
which involve appraisals of a negative event as unbearable and intolerable; and (iv) 
Depreciation beliefs which reflect global negative evaluations of the self, others, and of life 
events. REBT theory states that Demandingness beliefs represent the core cognitive construct 
in the emergence and maintenance of psychopathological responses and their impact on such 
outcomes will be mediated through the secondary irrational belief processes of 
Catastrophizing, Low Frustration Tolerance, and Depreciation beliefs (David, Schnur, & 
Belloiu, 2002; DiLorenzo, David, & Montgomery, 2007). Recent empirical findings have 
provided further support for this hypothesised organisation of the irrational beliefs 
specifically in the context of PTSD, and highlighted the importance of these cognitive 
processes in the prediction of posttraumatic stress responses (see Hyland, Shevlin, Adamson, 
& Boduszek, 2013). 
 Despite the empirical support such findings offer REBT theory in general, the field of 
REBT has been criticised from many within the wider cognitive-behavioural therapy 
community for lacking the ability to develop disorder-specific models of psychopathology 
(Padesky & Beck, 2003). A more elaborated version of REBT theory (see Dryden, 2009) 
states that the presence of generalised irrational beliefs represent cognitive vulnerability 
factors for the development of psychopathology given that activation of these belief systems 
during specific activating events biases information processing in a manner congruent with 
the activated belief systems. An individual is then prone to making a number of inaccurate 
misinterpretations of daily events. These distorted thoughts and inferences are the types of 
cognitions currently emphasised within cognitive models of PTSD derived from the theory of 
CT. REBT theory predicts however that these distorted representations while necessary 
cognitions for the development of psychopathological responses, are by themselves 
insufficient to produce a psychopathological response. In order that a psychopathological 
response emerges, such distorted inferential cognitions must be evaluated by means of a 
context-specific set of irrational beliefs. Unfortunately, empirical evidence regarding the role 
of context-specific variations of the irrational beliefs is generally sparse in the REBT 
literature and is non-existent in the context of PTSD. REBT theory has predominately 
favoured a more trans-diagnostic approach to theoretical considerations of psychopathology 
however given that recent theoretical formulations (Dryden, 2009) stress the importance of 
context-specific manifestations of the irrational belief processes as the most proximate 
antecedent of psychopathological outcomes, there is a pressing need to investigate the role of 
context-specific irrational beliefs in a variety of psychiatric disorders.  
Sociodemographic Predictors of PTSD  
 Beyond the cognitive factors found to be important predictors of posttraumatic stress 
responses, researchers have investigated a multitude of sociodemographic factors crucial in 
the development and maintenance of PTSD. Population-based research designs and 
conditional risk studies indicate that although males are exposed to a greater number of 
traumatic events, females are more likely than males to experience posttraumatic stress 
responses (Breslau et al., 1998; Galea et al., 2007; Kessler et al., 1995). It has been suggested 
that females exhibit greater levels of posttraumatic stress symptomology due to the higher 
incidence of exposure to particularly toxic traumas such as sexual abuse (Creamer et al., 
2001; Kessler et al., 1995), as well as an increased history of other anxiety and depressive 
disorders that increase their vulnerability. PTSD is especially prevalent during adolescence to 
mid-adulthood. In the United States national comorbidity survey, the median age of onset of 
PTSD was 23 (Kessler, Berglund, et al., 2005). Interestingly, it is quite rare to identify new 
cases of PTSD in persons above the age of 50. Prevalence of PTSD symptomology appears to 
decease with age even when trauma exposure continues (Kessler et al., 1995; Kessler, 
Berglund, et al., 2005). Lack of social support subsequent to experiencing a trauma has also 
been found repeatedly to be related to a diagnosis of PTSD (e.g. Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 
2003; Ullman, Filipas, Townsend, & Starzynski, 2007). In a large scale meta-analysis 
Brewin, Andrews, & Valentine (2000) found a moderate relationship (r = .40) between lack 
of social support and PTSD, while Ozer and colleagues (2003) identified weaker but still 
robust relationship of r = .28 between the two variables.  
 The current study is carried out in order to substantially contribute to the empirical 
literature by investigating the direct effect of trauma-specific irrational beliefs, along with a 
range of important sociodemographic factors including number or reported traumatic 
experiences, age, gender, occupation type, and current marital status, on the prediction of 
PTSD symptomology. This study will therefore mark the first effort to investigate the role of 
context-specific variants of the irrational beliefs outlined in REBT theory in the prediction of 
PTSD symptomology. 
Methods 
Participants and Procedures 
The sample for the current study consisted of three hundred and thirteen participants (N = 
313). The sample consisted of an international group of soldiers (n = 81, 25.9%), and police 
and associated emergency service personnel (n = 232, 74.1%) recruited from active duty 
while serving in the Republic of Ireland and the Republic of Kosovo over a twelve month 
period (June 2011 – June 2012). The sample consisted of 212 males (67.7%) and 101 females 
(32.3%) with participants ranging in age from 23 to 65 (M = 38.18, SD = 8.70). All 
participants included in the current study had reported experiencing at least one Criterion A 
trauma. The most commonly reported traumatic event was being involved in a serious 
accident (60.4%, n = 189), followed by a non-sexual assault by a stranger (56.9%, n = 178), 
and military combat (42.5%, n = 133). Participants were informed of the nature of the study 
being under taken either by a member of the research team or an assigned liaison for a 
particular organisation, and each participant’s involvement in the research project was 
voluntary. Those choosing to take part in the research project had the option of completing 
either an anonymous self-administered paper-and-pencil version of the questionnaires or an 
electronic version which was delivered and returned via email. The majority of respondents 
chose the paper-and-pencil option (63.26%, n = 198).  
Materials 
 The Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS: Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 
1997) is a 49-item self-report measure of the severity of posttraumatic stress symptomology 
related to a particular traumatic event. The PDS assess all aspects of a PTSD diagnosis from 
Criteria A to F as outlined in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994). The PDS measures the nature of the 
traumatic experience, the duration of the experienced symptoms, the impact of the 
experienced symptoms on daily functioning, and the severity of the symptoms. Seventeen 
items measure each of the identified symptoms of PTSD along a four-point Likert scale. 
Respondents rate the severity of each symptom from a score of 0 ("not at all or only one 
time") to 3 ("5 or more times a week / almost always"). This produces a total range of scores 
from 0 to 51 with higher scores indicating higher levels of posttraumatic stress 
symptomology. Scores from 0-10 reflect mild symptoms of PTSD; scores from 11-20 reflect 
moderate symptoms of PTSD; scores from 21-35 reflect moderate-to-severe symptoms of 
PTSD; while scores from 36-51 reflect severe symptoms of PTSD. Within the current sample 
59% (n = 181) of respondents reported mild symptoms, 15.3% (n = 47) reported moderate 
symptoms, 24.4% (n = 75) reported moderate-severe symptoms, and 1.3% (n = 4) reported 
severe symptoms. On the basis of the relatively unequal distribution of participants in each 
classification, for the purposes on the current study participants were classified into one of 
two groups: The “mildly symptomatic” group who reported scores on the PDS from 0-10 (n = 
181, 59%) and the “strongly symptomatic” group who reported scores on the PDS from 11 or 
above (n = 126, 41%). The PDS possess strong psychometric properties with Griffin, 
Uhlmansiek, Resick, and Mechanic (2004) demonstrating that it shares a strong correlation (r 
= .71) with the Clinician-Administered PTSD scale (Blake et al., 1995). The PDS 
demonstrated satisfactory internal reliability among the current sample with the full scale 
recording a Cronbach’s Alpha value of 0.95. 
 In order to measure context-specific variants of each of the four irrational belief 
processes a new scale called the Trauma-Related Irrational Belief Scale (TRIBS) was 
constructed (see Appendix A for the full scale). The TRIBS is an 8-item self-report measure 
of irrational beliefs specifically related to the experience of a traumatic life event. The scale 
was constructed in accordance with guidelines set forth by Montgomery, David, DiLorenzo, 
and Schnur (2007) in the development of their ‘Exam-Related Belief Scale’ which was used 
to capture rational and irrational beliefs specifically related to the context of exam-related 
distress. The TRIBS includes sub-scales for each of the four irrational belief processes and 
each belief process is measured via two items. Examples from each belief process include; “I 
absolutely should have acted differently than I did during the traumatic event that I 
experienced” (Demandingness); “The traumatic event that I experienced was completely 
awful and catastrophic; the worst thing that could have happened” (Catastrophizing); “I 
can’t stand the fact that I had to experience this traumatic event and I find it hard to 
experience any kind of happiness as a result” (Low Frustration Tolerance); and “I think that 
life is less worthwhile because of what happened during the traumatic event” (Depreciation). 
Items of the TRIBS are scored along a five-point Likert scale from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 
5 (“Strongly Agree”). Items 4 and 6 included in the scale were scored in a reverse direction 
(i.e., strongly disagree = 5 and strongly agree = 1). Scores on each subscale range from 2-10, 
while a total composite score of irrationality can be obtained by summating all eight items. 
Total scores for the TRIBS can therefore range between 8 and 40. In every case higher scores 
reflect higher levels of irrationality. Internal consistency for the full scale was satisfactory (α 
= .95), and each of the subscales also yielded acceptable results with all alpha levels 
exceeding .80. 
[Insert table 1 here] 
Results 
Group Differences 
Table 2 presents group differences (between the mildly and strongly symptomatic groups) on 
trauma-specific Demandingness, Catastrophizing, Low Frustration Tolerance, and 
Depreciation beliefs, respectively, along with number of reported traumatic experiences. 
Independent sample t-test results suggest that those individuals reporting strong symptoms of 
PTSD (M = 7.49, SD = 2.23) and those reporting mild symptoms of PTSD (M = 3.85, SD = 
1.86) significantly differed (t(305) = -15.07,  p < .001, η2 = .43) with regards to the scores on 
trauma-specific Demandingness beliefs with higher scores reported by those experiencing 
strong symptoms of PTSD. Furthermore, those experiencing strong symptoms of PTSD (M = 
6.90, SD = 2.36) scored significantly higher (t(305) = -15.92,  p < .001, η2 = .45)  than those 
experiencing mild symptoms of PTSD (M = 3.19, SD = 1.36) on levels of trauma-specific 
Catastrophizing beliefs. Similarly, data suggests that those individuals reporting strong 
symptoms of PTSD (M = 6.77, SD = 2.76) tend to report increased levels of trauma-specific 
Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs (t(305) = -17.01,  p < .001, η2 = .49) comparing to those 
experiencing mild symptoms of PTSD (M = 2.41, SD = 0.97). Finally, strongly symptomatic 
respondents (M = 6.81, SD = 2.39) were found to possess higher levels of trauma-specific 
Depreciation beliefs (t(304) = -15.29,  p < .001, η2 = .44) than the mildly-symptomatic group 
(M = 3.20, SD = 1.38). In terms of number of experienced traumas, results from the 
independent samples t-tests did not indicate any significant differences between the two 
groups. Partial eta squared values (η2) indicated that the magnitude of difference between the 
two groups on each of the respective irrational belief processes were large. 
[Insert table 2 here] 
Binary Logistic Regression 
Direct binary logistic regression analysis was performed to assess the impact of trauma-
specific Demandingness beliefs, Catastrophizing beliefs, Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs, 
and Depreciation beliefs, respectively, along with number of traumas experienced, age, 
gender, occupation type, and marital status on the likelihood of reporting strong symptoms of 
PTSD following exposure to at least one traumatic life experience. The correlations amongst 
all continuous predictor variables included in the study were examined (see Table 3).  Each of 
the four irrational belief processes were positively related to one another, and to a 
moderately-strong degree with r values ranging between .59 (p < .001) to .80 (p < .001). 
Although some of these correlations were strong, investigation of the Tolerance and VIF 
statistics demonstrated that these associations did not exceed recommended levels indicating 
that multicollinearity was unlikely to be a problem (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
[Insert table 3 here] 
 A test of the full model containing all predictor variables against a constant-only 
model was statistically significant, X2 (9, 302) = 273.617, p < .001, indicating that the model 
was able to distinguish between individuals who reported experiencing strong symptoms of 
PTSD and those that reported experiencing just mild symptoms. The model as a whole 
explained between 60% (Cox and Snell R square) and 80% (Nagelkerke R square) of the 
variance in PTSD status, and displayed satisfactory positive predictive value correctly 
classifying 89.7% of cases.  
 As shown in Table 4, only three of the variables in the model made a unique 
statistically significant contribution to the model (trauma-specific Catastrophizing beliefs, 
trauma-specific Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs, and trauma-specific Depreciation beliefs). 
The strongest predictor of belonging to the PTSD symptomology group was trauma-specific 
Depreciation beliefs (OR = 1.77, p < .01). This result indicates that for every unit increase in 
Depreciation beliefs related to a traumatic experience, an individual was 1.77 times more 
likely to belong to the strongly symptomatic PTSD group, controlling for all other factors in 
the model. Trauma-specific Catastrophizing beliefs (OR = 1.71, p < .01), and trauma-specific 
Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs (OR = 1.70, p < .01) exhibited similar results, suggesting 
that individuals scoring higher on both variable were approximately 1.7 times more likely to 
belong to the PTSD symptomology group than those individuals with lower levels of each 
belief process, controlling for all other factors in the model. 
[Insert table 4 here] 
Discussion 
The primary aim of the current study was to provide initial evidence of the role of trauma-
specific irrational beliefs (as described by REBT theory) in the likelihood of reporting 
clinically significant symptoms of PTSD, while controlling for a range of important 
sociodemographic risk factors. This research was undertaken in order to contribute to the 
field of REBT by evaluating the importance of each irrational belief process in distinguishing 
between those trauma-exposed individuals who develop serious symptoms of PTSD and 
those who develop mild symptoms. Furthermore, the current study was performed in order to 
highlight to the wider cognitive-behavioural therapy community the importance of the 
specific types of dysfunctional cognitions described in REBT theory in the predictions of 
PTSD symptomology.  
 Initial investigations revealed very large differences between the strongly 
symptomatic and mildly-symptomatic groups on each of the irrational belief processes. In 
each case the strongly symptomatic groups exhibited substantially higher levels of each 
irrational belief process than the mildly-symptomatic group. These results although striking 
are generally unsurprising in that they indicate that those participants displaying strong 
symptoms of PTSD display far high levels of irrationality compared to those who reported 
mild levels of PTSD. An interesting finding was that trauma-specific Demandingness beliefs 
were the most strongly endorsed irrational belief process among the strongly symptomatic 
group. These beliefs are hypothesised to represent the core cognitive variables in the 
emergence of PTSD according to REBT theory (Ellis, 2001) and current results indicate a 
high endorsement rate among the current sample. 
 Results from the binary logistic regression analysis produced strong support for the 
theoretical model, with nearly 90% of participants correctly classified, a substantial 
improvement over the nearly 60% of correctly classified cases in the constant only model. 
The results of this analysis identified three predictor variables that made a unique, statistically 
significant contribution to the prediction of reporting strong symptoms of PTSD. These three 
predictors were the secondary irrational belief processes: Catastrophizing, Low Frustration 
Tolerance, and Depreciation beliefs. Notably, once the effects of the cognitive factors were 
controlled for, none of the sociodemographic variables included in this study (age, number of 
trauma’s experienced, gender, marital status, and occupation type) made a statistically 
significant contribution to the prediction of reporting strong symptoms of PTSD. Although 
previous studies have identified these factors as important in the prediction of PTSD itself, 
current findings suggest that these variables do little to differentiate those who display 
clinically significant levels of PTSD from those who display mild symptoms, and as such are 
far less important in understanding the development of more severe symptoms of PTSD 
compared to the role of irrational beliefs. 
 Each of the three irrational belief processes identified as statistically significant 
predictors of belonging to the PTSD symptomology group yielded similar odds ratio levels, 
however trauma-specific Depreciation beliefs did emerge as the strongest predictor. 
Individuals who reported ever increasing levels of negative self-evaluative beliefs related to 
their traumatic experience were increasingly likely to report strong symptoms of PTSD. This 
finding is generally consistent with previous work applying the PTCI (Foa et al., 1999) which 
found that the latent factor reflecting negative views of the self was most strongly associated 
with developing PTSD (Daie-Gabai et al., 2011; Foa & Rauch, 2004). Current results 
therefore provide additional evidence that negative evaluations of the self are a critical 
cognitive vulnerability factor in the development and maintenance of posttraumatic stress 
responses.  
 Catastrophizing and Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs displayed near identical odds 
ratio values with results indicating that the more extreme a person’s evaluations of the 
badness of the traumatic event, and the more one evaluates himself or herself as being unable 
to cope with, or withstand, the effects of the traumatic incident, the greater their likelihood of 
reporting strong symptoms of PTSD. Although approaching the level of statistical 
significance, Demandingness beliefs did not make a unique contribution to the prediction of 
reporting symptoms of PTSD despite being the most strongly endorsed irrational belief 
process among the symptomatic group. This result is generally consistent with the predictions 
of REBT theory which states that Demandingness beliefs will not exert a direct influence on 
psychopathological outcomes but should instead indirectly impact psychological distress via 
the secondary irrational belief processes, all of which were identified as statistically 
significant predictors. 
 These results have a number of important implications to the REBT literature and the 
wider scientific literature regarding the cognitive constructs integral to the development and 
maintenance of posttraumatic stress responses. According to REBT theory, various 
psychopathological outcomes result from differential interactions between the primary 
irrational belief process and the various secondary irrational belief processes (David et al., 
2002). Anxiety disorders are predicted to arise as a consequence of an interaction between 
Demandingness beliefs and Catastrophizing and/or Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs. 
Results of the current study are partially supportive of this prediction in that both 
Catastrophizing and Low Frustration Tolerance were identified as important predictors of 
posttraumatic stress responses. Additionally, Depreciation beliefs, which are hypothesised to 
be more relevant to depressive disorders (David et al., 2002), were also found to be a 
significant factor in the prediction of PTSD symptomology. PTSD and depression are well 
established to share a high degree of comorbidity (Kessler, et al., 1995; Zlotnick, Johnson, 
Kohn, Vicente, Rioseco, & Saldiva, 2006) and based on current and previous findings (e.g. 
Daie-Gabai et al., 2011; Foa & Rauch, 2004) it is possible that the comorbidity between these 
disorders is the result of the operation of the same basic cognitive process, namely negative 
evaluations of the self. Alternatively, given the cross-sectional nature of the studies from 
which these findings arise, it is possible that the consistent finding of a relationship between 
negative self-evaluative beliefs and posttraumatic stress responses is a consequence of failing 
to control for the presence of depressive symptomology. Future studies should seek to 
investigate the effect of trauma-specific irrational beliefs, specifically Depreciation belief, on 
PTSD while controlling for the effect of depression, in order to more fully investigate this 
possibility. It is also interesting to note that in the new DSM-5 PTSD is no longer listed as an 
anxiety disorder, and is now rather included as a stress- and trauma-related disorder. Current 
findings may therefore indicate a development of David and colleagues (2002) model and 
suggest that stress- and trauma-related disorders arise as consequence of interactions between 
Demandingness beliefs and all three secondary belief processes.  
 Furthermore results of the present study provide additional evidence supporting the 
role of irrational beliefs in posttraumatic stress responses. Previous findings (Hyland et al., 
2013) indicated that generalised forms of each of the irrational belief processes played an 
important role in the prediction of each symptom group of PTSD (Re-experiencing, 
Avoidance, Dysphoria, and Hyperarousal). Current results indicate that trauma-specific 
variants of the irrational beliefs are effective in differentiating strong from mild symptoms of 
PTSD, while also considering a range of important sociodemographic factors.  
 As with any research endeavour the current study contains a number of limitations 
which ought to be considered. The nature of the sample is limited to a specific strata of the 
population (law enforcement and military personnel), thus generalisations of current findings 
to the wider population is problematic. Additionally, a self-report measure of PTSD 
symptomology was used and although self-report measures of PTSD such as the PDS (Foa et 
al., 1997) used in the current study have been shown to highly correspond with clinician-
administered measures (Griffin et al., 2004), clinician based measures would have been 
preferable as they are considered the gold standard method of assessing PTSD 
symptomology. Additionally correlations among the various irrational belief processes were 
rather high which may well have accounted for the non-significant effect of Demandingness 
beliefs, however this is a perennial issue in REBT research given that the irrational beliefs are 
expected to share a high degree of association with each other and particularly in relationship 
to Demandingness beliefs. The continued development of ever more refined psychometic 
instruments with improved discriminant validity is clearly required. 
 In conclusion, this article has provided the first piece of empirical evidence 
demonstrating the direct effect of trauma-related irrational beliefs as outlined in REBT theory 
in the prediction of posttraumatic stress responses. Specifically, findings from the current 
study demonstrated that higher levels of trauma-related Catastrophizing, Low Frustration 
Tolerance, and Depreciation beliefs all predict a greater probability of reporting clinically 
significant symptoms of PTSD, while controlling for the effects of a range of key 
sociodemographic factors. These results thus provide a substantial contribution to the wider 
scientific literature regarding the types of cognitive variables involved in posttraumatic stress 
responses, and contribute additional empirical support for the predictions of REBT theory in 
the context of a psychiatric disorder that has not been widely investigated by the field. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
 
The Trauma Related Irrational Belief Scale 
 
As you answer the following questions please think about the traumatic event you described 
in the previous section of this questionnaire. 
 
For each statement below please indicate whether you Strongly Disagree (A), Somewhat 
Disagree (B), are Neutral (C), Somewhat Agree (D), or Strongly Agree (E). 
 
 
 
A 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
B 
SOMEWHAT 
DISAGREE 
C 
NEUTRAL 
D 
SOMEWHAT 
AGREE 
E 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
 
1. I absolutely should have acted differently during the 
traumatic event that I experienced. 
 
A B C D E 
2. The traumatic event that I experienced absolutely should not 
have happened. 
 
A B C D E 
3. The traumatic event that I experienced was completely awful 
and catastrophic; the worst thing that could have happened. 
 
A B C D E 
4. The traumatic event that I experience was extremely bad and 
unpleasant but it wasn’t the worst thing that could have 
happened. 
 
A B C D E 
5. I can’t stand the fact that I had to experience this traumatic 
event and I find it hard to experience any kind of happiness 
as a result. 
 
A B C D E 
6. Although I don’t like the fact that I experienced this 
traumatic event, I can stand the fact that it happened, and I 
find that I can experience happiness despite it. 
 
A B C D E 
7. I think that I am less worthwhile as a person because of what 
happened during the traumatic event. 
 
A B C D E 
8. I think that life is less worthwhile because of what happened 
during the traumatic event. 
 
A B C D E 
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Table 1  
Frequencies for the current sample of military and police and emergency service officers on 
each demographic variable (N = 313) 
Variable Frequency Valid Percentage 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
 
212 
101 
 
67.7 
32.3 
Job 
Police/Emergency Services 
Military 
 
232 
81 
 
74.1 
25.9 
Marital Status 
Married  
Divorced 
 
282 
31 
 
90.1 
9.9 
Groups 
Mildly symptomatic 
Strongly symptomatic 
 
181 
126 
 
59 
41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Group differences between individuals with symptoms of PTSD and No-PTSD for irrational 
beliefs and number of traumas 
 Group N M SD t η2 
Demandingness Mildly Symptomatic 
Strongly Symptomatic 
181 
126 
3.85 
7.49 
1.86 
2.23 
-15.07* .43 
Catastrophizing Mildly Symptomatic 
Strongly Symptomatic 
181 
126 
3.19 
6.90 
1.36 
2.36 
-15.92* .45 
Low Frustration 
Tolerance 
Mildly Symptomatic 
Strongly Symptomatic 
181 
126 
2.41 
6.77 
0.97 
2.76 
-17.01* .49 
Depreciation Mildly Symptomatic 
Strongly Symptomatic 
181 
126 
3.20 
6.81 
1.38 
2.39 
-15.29* .44 
Number of 
Traumas 
Mildly Symptomatic 
Strongly Symptomatic 
181 
126 
2.69 
2.91 
1.44 
1.56 
-1.25 
 
.21 
 
Note. Statistical significance: *p < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics, correlations, and reliability between all continuous predictor variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Demandingness 
2. Catastrophizing 
3. LFT 
4. Depreciation 
5. Age 
6. Number of Traumas 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Range 
Cronbach Alpha 
1 
.61* 
.66* 
.80* 
-.04 
.04 
5.33 
2.69 
2-10 
.81 
 
1 
.76* 
.59* 
-.06 
.00 
4.72 
2.58 
2-10 
.81 
 
 
1 
.75* 
-.06 
.01 
4.18 
2.87 
2-10 
.96 
 
 
 
1 
-.03 
.04 
4.67 
2.57 
2-10 
.81 
 
 
 
 
1 
.18* 
38.18 
8.70 
23-65 
n/a 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2.75 
1.51 
011 
n/a 
Note. Statistical significance: *p < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Binary Logistic Regression analysis predicting likelihood of reporting strong symptoms of 
PTSD  
Variable B S.E. Exp(B) with 95% C.I. 
    
Demandingness .23 .13 1.26 (0.99 / 1.62) 
Catastrophizing .53 .14 1.71* (1.29 / 2.25) 
Low Frustration Tolerance .53 .16 1.70* (1.24 / 2.33) 
Depreciation .57 .16 1.77* (1.28 /2.44) 
Age .03 .03 1.03 (.97 / 1.09) 
Number of Trauma .11 .15 1.12 (.83 / 1.49) 
Gender 
     Female 
     Male 
 
 
.54 
 
 
.51 
 
1 
1.71 (0.63 / 4.68) 
Group 
     Police 
     Military 
 
 
.11 
 
 
.57 
 
1 
1.12 (0.37 / 3.40) 
Marital Status 
     Married 
     Divorced 
 
 
.19 
 
 
.72 
 
1 
1.21 (0.29 / 4.96) 
Note. Significance level: * p < .01 
